

## HOME GUARD, POLICE, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

BY

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# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## HOME GUARD, POLICE, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Establishing local security through indigenous security forces or “Home Guard” programs has proven beneficial to establish security and separate the population from the insurgents. Joint and Army doctrine provides for host nation government creation of home guard security forces, but it does not go far enough in stressing their importance. Research from previous counterinsurgency campaigns and theorists has identified the linkages of home guard, auxiliaries, and police forces and the overall success of the campaigns. To benefit from historic lessons, we should draw them into our doctrine. Based on conditions we can approach the situation from three sides. If the host nation government can be or is trusted then we can build a home guard through them. If no police force or host nation government exists we should first build a robust home guard and then transition those proven effective individuals into the core of a police force. If a corrupt or non-functioning police force exists then we should form home guard or auxiliaries that should remain under our control and then be used to modify the police force behavior for the overall counterinsurgency success.





## HOME GUARD, POLICE, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule.

— Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency<sup>1</sup>

Herodotus' description of Deiokes describes the beginnings of the social contract between people and an empowered person that is trusted to deliver justice, and a rule of law.<sup>2</sup> Alternatively, governments can be based on powerful leaders who impose themselves on the people. Deiokes' example represents a social contract between the people and their government where a measure of freedom and individuality is traded for personal security.<sup>3</sup> When the contract is not sound, we see the legitimacy of governments questioned (sometimes through insurgencies), personal security endangered, and the rule-of-law challenged. Long term security, good governance, and the rule-of-law are permanently linked.

Our own operations in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the linkage of personal security and support to the government and/or insurgent. Often times insurgents will seek to gain or coerce the population's acquiescence to their authority over that of the government. The recent security victory in Iraq is perhaps the clearest case of how important personal security is. Personal or local security is not enough, and we continue to look for signs of how the population's participation through the so-called "Sons of Iraq" or Sunni Awakening and local reconciliation programs translate into a larger political reform and eventual good governance. The missing link needed to translate this personal security to good governance is the rule-of-law and public order. The segments of the population that shifted their allegiance from the various insurgent groups to our

counterinsurgency program continue to seek a better social contract with their government. A clear step to linking them to their government is the integration of qualified and tested members of these local tribal or village-based security forces. Similar programs have been attempted in Afghanistan with varying success. In general, where the programs are linked to trusted social systems (tribes & villages) they are improving the situation; where programs are linked to untrusted systems (warlords and a divided or corrupt national government), they are not.

We have also seen many violent challenges to legitimacy in history. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an “organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”<sup>4</sup> A brief review of theorists and insurgencies can help us better understand how important good governance, security and the social contract is in designing a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Our study confirms that the complexities involved in this form of warfare make it impossible to identify a certain path to victory, but we can still identify good practices and draw upon them for future operations. Reforming government, securing the populace and rebuilding the people’s trust in their government are clear components of any successful COIN campaign.

In this paper I will argue for the linking of a successful COIN practice of population security through the recruitment of indigenous or village security forces to the long-term resourcing of local police forces in order to repair the overall social contract and bring about better government.

### Selected COIN Theory

Counterinsurgency theorists Galula, Kitson, Thompson, Paget and Kilcullen are largely in agreement on the need for comprehensive population-focused COIN strategy

based on a realistic understanding of the complete milieu. Drawing on their experience and studies we can link personal security and good governance with COIN success.

In Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, we find his "Laws" or a template to success in a population centric COIN campaign.<sup>5</sup> In his first law, control of the population is the key. The success or failure of a counterinsurgent's effort will be measured by the leanings of the people. In the second law we learn that the larger population can be controlled through an "active minority," and we can gain their acquiescence by selecting, recruiting, evaluating, and empowering the right minority. The opposite is also true; our insurgent foes are also attempting to build support for their cause by doing the same. In the third law, he cautions that the support of the people is conditional; the counterinsurgent must be seen as the strongest faction. In his final or fourth law, Galula highlights the importance of creating a program whose success seems inevitable to the population and we learn the steps that are behind the current clear-hold-build tactics.<sup>6</sup> His practical steps include military clearance followed by a series of combined military and population holding steps that, when implemented, generate a larger political building process that is key to a successful counterinsurgency operation.

Brigadier Frank Kitson agrees with the requirement to gain the support of the population, whose belief in the inevitability of the counterinsurgent's plan is necessary for its success.<sup>7</sup> Reviewing US doctrine in the '70s as a third party to the ongoing "internal defence and development," Kitson highlights the US views of the time that steered clear of terms like "counterinsurgency" or "counter-subversion." If the people believe that the external power is not committed, then there is no incentive to side

against the insurgents. He goes on to highlight the importance of a strong civilian-military relationship, coordination, and the importance of securing the population.<sup>8</sup> He also briefly outlines a technique to secure the population when the counterinsurgent has insufficient forces through “police and locally raised forces.”<sup>9</sup>

Sir Robert Thompson’s principles are also in agreement with other theorists. In addition to highlighting the importance of an overall campaign plan that is both seen by the population as unstoppable and addresses all aspects of the insurgency, he further described four stages of a successful counterinsurgency: “clearing, holding, winning and won.”<sup>10</sup> In his post-Malaysian operations advising role, “Sir Robert Thompson had high praise for the [US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon] CAP”<sup>11</sup> that linked a Marine Rifle Squad with a locally resourced self-defense force (Popular Forces). His final principle highlights the “establishment of base areas” that the government uses as a foundation for expanding security to the rural areas.<sup>12</sup>

Colonel Julian Paget also highlights the importance of separating the population from insurgents through either resettling them or establishing a “Home Guard.”<sup>13</sup> In his Malayan and Kenyan case studies he shows the importance and direct relationship of these programs to the overall success of the comprehensive COIN campaign.

A recent theorist, David Kilcullen, builds on the others and stresses the importance of better coordination between the COIN community, the peace-building and development community, and the rule-of-law community.<sup>14</sup> All three communities represent the essential components of the grander social contract that must be reestablished for success. Kilcullen also notes the benefits of bottom-up focused COIN,

especially where the host nation (HN) government is seen as ineffectual, corrupt, or illegitimate.<sup>15</sup>

### Relevant Doctrine & Policy

The *Counterinsurgency* manual (FM 3-24)<sup>16</sup> notes the importance of securing the population by HN forces and periodic patrols. With the full understanding that our forces will be unable to physically secure all of the people, we seek to provide overall security with mobile patrols and presence. Key infrastructure will be secured, HN assets maximized, and funds established to pay for damages, but individual villages or homes are too numerous to be secured directly. Doctrinally we are hesitant to raise indigenous and untrained security or paramilitary forces; as a military we are more comfortable accepting a uniformed HN security force (even if it is ineffectual) over an armed and ill-disciplined population.<sup>17</sup> This can be seen by our acceptance of risk in providing for a wide area security through mobile patrols versus the crude civilian checkpoints established in Iraq as part of the Sunni Awakening of 2007.

The combined work of the United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, provides a concise comprehensive catalog of important factors necessary for a safe and secure environment, social well-being, stable governance, the rule of law, and a sustainable economy.<sup>18</sup> As a key principle that cuts across the others, governmental legitimacy begins as “a bargain between citizens and the government”<sup>19</sup> and requires the state to provide security and other critical functions. The work goes on to review the trade-offs inherent with stability enhancements from other international actors, HN legitimacy, and the challenges of

unrealistic expectations of the HN population or "agreement on the strategic direction for stabilization and reconstruction."<sup>20</sup>

The population's support is key for the insurgent's strategy to defeat the government and it is gained by control of an active minority. "It is a well-known principle of counterinsurgency that in the battle between the government and insurgents, support of the civilian population is the key to victory."<sup>21</sup> Insurgents typically gain support of the active minority through a compelling cause or through coercion and intimidation, while the modern counterinsurgent is more limited to gaining support by providing security and addressing the insurgent's "cause." In a revolutionary war, that includes an initial strategic defensive phase with time to create the political infrastructure, the support of the people comes from the cause and is built over time. An urban style insurgency, without protracted time to build support, requires a more risky and rapid technique to gain control of the population. These techniques (including force, threats, and coercion) can be particularly damaging to the credibility of the HN government and security forces while being risky, in the initial stages, for the insurgent.

Returning to the basic idea of a social contract between the people and their government, the government's obligation is to provide security, safety, and stability first. For the people, this includes security from both internal and external threats, and they expect to see it in the form of secure borders, low crime, and a justice system that provides a non-violent alternative to civil conflict. An essential condition for maintaining the public's trust is also a fair, open, and non-corrupt government. Once security has been established and maintained, additional services and programs will be expected by the population.<sup>22</sup>

The rule of law is directly related to internal security; without it warring parties, insurgents, criminal groups and even regular citizens may use violence and force to resolve grievances, take or secure resources, and conduct business.<sup>23</sup> Disruption of the rule of law is beneficial to the insurgents and much easier to do than protection of it by the HN or an outside actor. The government must demonstrate its ability to defend law and order everywhere, while the insurgent gets to choose the time and place to attack it. As a foreign government we are further challenged. If we take action to protect the rule of law then we risk insurgent claims that our actions highlight the HN government's inability or unwillingness to meet its own duties. On the other hand, if we do not act we run the risk of the HN government's failure, while having to answer to our own citizens when they ask why we are even supporting a failing HN government.<sup>24</sup>

Police forces are a critical and daily link between citizens and their government. During an insurgency this essential public order relationship is deeply wounded and in dire need of assistance. Our national leaders understand the nature of this relationship and the effects of a foreign government's misuse or neglect of its police forces, and are wary of our own military influence or interaction in the relationship. As a policy Congress bans most military assistance to foreign police because of these and other concerns,<sup>25</sup> but has authorized exceptions and allowed support and training in situations of high need. When actively involved in COIN and post-conflict scenarios we may find that some form of authorization will be allowed. A better program for foreign police training can and should be designed prior to one of these high-need times, and while beyond the scope of this paper, how we organize to conduct the training is just as essential as how those forces are recruited and manned. In a recent article, Walter C. Ladwig III

outlines a better national policy and its benefits for a foreign police training policy under control of the State Department.<sup>26</sup>

In 2006, at the height of internal sectarian violence in Iraq, as many as 75% of Iraqi citizens did not trust their police and did not feel safe providing tips to their local police.<sup>27</sup> This isolated survey represents a widely held Iraqi distrust of their police and is partial evidence of the grievous break in the central social contract of good governance and security. The break went beyond an individual's personal security to the overall fragmentation of the larger social order throughout the country.<sup>28</sup> Without public order, legitimate and effective HN governmental control of violence and the rule of law, sub-groups of the population turned to a rule of force in an attempt to provide personal security. The resulting security break degenerated into a condition of self-sustaining violence, and permeated throughout all aspects of the society. Without a strong, intelligent, and fair outside influencer these situations could require decades to resolve themselves, as historic examples ranging from European fighting during the 30 Years War to the ongoing Somalia chaos show.

Corrupt and ineffectual local law enforcement is both a cause and a result of these types of situations. A reinforcing negative cycle develops where HN and international militaries are overwhelmed and outnumbered by insurgents, criminals, and vigilantes. Partnering with the local people is a proven technique to address their basic security needs, but it comes with risks. Of course, the most preferred partners are HN police forces so we can also benefit from building on their legitimacy, but often times they are part of the problem. Ideally, the local law enforcement security forces can be retrained, monitored, and reinvigorated, but sometimes this is time intensive or



impossible. However, when the HN police forces are corrupt, overwhelmed or ineffective partnering with them is either nonproductive or even counterproductive. In these common situations, trusting the people and their own social structures like tribes and informal village groups is required.

When it comes to the security of peoples' homes, families, and neighbors results matter. Good intentions, a well designed information campaign, or even a well-funded claims program are insufficient when compared to the physical and psychological effects of the coercion practices by insurgents and criminal gangs. A well designed and resourced home guard of indigenous people are much better at providing continuous security than accepting risks and gaps by only using military forces who may be pulled away for other missions. By design the home guard does not leave and is constantly on vigil. In addition to enhanced security, drawing from the local village also provides employment and may begin to rebuild the local community and the trust between the people and their government.

Locally raised or community-based security groups created during times of security emergencies, insurgencies, or post-conflict phases have been used successfully for resourcing security forces, repairing the social contract, and gaining the citizen's trust. Successful previous examples of self-defense community-based security groups include Iraq, Greece, Malaysia, Oman, the Philippines, Peru, Greece, Guatemala, Colombia and to a certain degree in the United States during our war of independence.<sup>29</sup> Frank Kitson, David Galula, and David Kilcullen acknowledged the extensive security personnel strength requirements to bring internal violence under control, and that they may exceed a nation's military and police security forces. While

the need is great and recruiting local defense forces have proven successful, it is essential that it be done correctly. The nature of the violence, the situation on the ground, and the overarching defensive strategy has to be well considered, understood, and carefully planned. These locally recruited or supported security forces should be an essential component to the overall COIN or post-conflict security strategy, as illustrated by several historic examples.

In the 1982 Guatemala counterinsurgency all able-bodied men from the villages were obligated to serve in government-directed and supported defensive patrol forces. The program was designed to renew and reinforce a social contract between the HN government, the individual villages, and the people. The army supplied weapons and training, and the men served without payment; instead, the government supported the locally defended villages with development projects and assistance. The government increased its legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the people provided security sanctioned and supported by the government and the program was essential to breaking the communist insurgency in the Western Highlands.<sup>30</sup>

In Malaysia, the British rapidly increased the size of the police forces by 50,000 with “special constables” and police auxiliaries. The new officers were plagued by lack of training, insufficient arms and numbers to protect themselves, widespread corruption and overreaching mission sets that led to their use as irregular infantry over law enforcement.<sup>31</sup> These faults required British leadership (Lieutenant General Briggs and later Sir Arthur Young) to take extensive measures to retrain, reorganize, and re-task the police.<sup>32</sup> In the meantime, the level of insecurity in the villages continued until the standing “home guard” program was revitalized and included neglected ethnic

Chinese.<sup>33</sup> Through the challenges and progress of their program we can see how the British succeeded when they linked the popular support of a locally raised home guard, government resourcing, and police training.

In Algeria, the French turned to locally recruited village security forces that provided village defense in support of other irregulars called Harkis. Training and arming provided by French forces and manning provided by the local tribes. These “Groupes d’auto-défence” once again provided physical links between the counterinsurgent, HN government, and the people to address their number one concern -- security. In addition, it began to repair the trust of the people in their government and created a mood of inevitability for the success of the government’s plan.<sup>34</sup>

In Iraq, our own experience shows how a desperate security situation of widespread sectarian violence, teetering on a full scale civil war, was brought under control by similar locally-based security programs. The initial tribally-based Sahwa in Anbar province was promoted by the people and supported by US/coalition forces. Moral and physical support of these groups made an immediate positive effect on the security situation and began to repair the level of trust between the people (through their tribes) and the counterinsurgent (US). Eventually the Iraqi government accepted the programs and provided limited support. Similar programs were developed in other provinces, all provided immediate security benefits, most were also grudgingly accepted by the Iraqi government, and some provided opportunities for long term repair of the social contract between the people and their government.<sup>35</sup>

#### Iraqi Awakening and Reconciliation Based on Village Security

Our Iraqi experience differed from previous cases in that several similar programs were developed from the bottom up and not designed and implemented from

the top down. Senior US political and military leaders readily accepted, supported and promoted the various initiatives, but without a larger template from above, the individual commander's programs varied and additional effort was necessary to get the Iraqi government to understand and accept them. One of the main differences in the various indigenous security forces can be generalized as either tribally-based or individually-led groups. Many of the programs were built on former insurgent fighters who had already broken their ties with the societally important tribes, while others were negotiated with tribal leaders. In general, the Iraqi government was wary of both types of groups and considered them to be "sleepers cells" of Sunni insurgents. The Iraqi government was most wary of the individually-led groups, while some members began to trust some of the tribally-based groups. The initial or "Anbar Awakening," groups were more trusted by the Iraqi government and slowly repaired the mutual trust between the people and their government. Both types of group were supported by the coalition forces, local and high level commanders, and both provided immediate security improvements, but when the locally-raised security forces were linked with an established social structure like a tribe or group of tribes they also provided a promise of future legitimacy. To avoid this type of uneven acceptance by a HN government the overall program should be guided by policies from the top-down, and then locally raised, trained, and supervised from the bottom-up.

From these examples we see that while immediate security improvements are important, they are not enough for a counterinsurgency victory. The security improvements must be accompanied, or at least immediately followed, by political improvements. Ideally, local police forces should be able to serve this critical link, but if

they are not then empowering trusted societal organizations in these short-term security improvements is a way to link these two essential reforms and develop long term stability.

#### Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

As we have seen, indigenous security group programs have proven successful in an overall COIN strategy and a great tool for both security and gaining the support of the population that leads to inevitability for COIN success.<sup>36</sup> From our own experience in Afghanistan and Iraq we also see how corrupt and ineffectual police forces are used by insurgents for their own benefit when they provide a daily and visible example of how the government is powerless to stop the insurgents' operations. Creating bad police forces is worse than no police force at all. We should use the village security forces to assess the effectiveness and corruptability of the individual members and leaders to identify future police force leaders. After identifying effective and trusted individuals we should use them to build the police forces that are further trained and developed into a professional police force. As a stable nation ourselves with a fully developed government and security forces we tend to expect the HN government to develop their own local security and local police programs. We can see how these programs should be exactly what is needed to address obvious HN governmental shortfalls, but they do not seem to meet these expectations. The missing link goes back to the damaged social contract between the citizens and their government, and this missing linkage is a major reason that we are involved as the outside counterinsurgency supporter.

We must convince the HN government that if a better organized, trained and educated security force does not include a better police station, non-corrupt police officers, or an integrated military security force then that nation's citizens will not trust

them. Results matter and those results are more likely to come from the bottom up.<sup>37</sup>

People want to be safe in their homes with their families, they want their neighbors and fellow villagers to be safe, and they are usually willing to participate in these local security programs if supported. Where HN governmental institutions are lacking, and the security situation creates a gap that prevents the government from interacting with its own people, the insurgency gains strength.

In tribal cultures, people look to the tribe for security and justice before the weaker or distant government, and are more inclined to understand, trust, and support a bottom-up locally-raised security force before a security force installed from the top-down. Later, the locally-raised and tested security force that is initially overwatched by a local village group or community council can be brought into the larger HN government.<sup>38</sup>

Of course, these approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. The goal of the counterinsurgent is the overall return to a fully functioning government that includes both high level good governance and low level public order. As the bottom-up village security forces are built, trained, supported, and monitored for security and future blending into a local law enforcement force, a top-down development training and development program is executed to enable the HN national and provincial leadership to function as a legitimate and trusted government. The broken trust and social contract needs to be repaired from both the bottom up and the top down.

A combined approach allows for the creation of immediate and trusted local security programs initially supported by international security forces with a more open and professional higher government that takes ownership of the local groups when they

are ready and trusted. The top-down plan would synchronize and support the bottom-up work. In a recent review essay, Seth Jones summarized this point best when he wrote:

The current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency efforts must take place alongside bottom-up programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to enlist them in providing security and services at the village and district levels.<sup>39</sup>

While the international community and US government have many programs, institutions, and people to train police forces, we continue to get corrupt and ineffectual police forces in these contested countries. The training process and international dedication for the programs is not the problem. The quality and motivations of the leaders and patrolmen are just as important to the overall success of a police force. We must address the entry level skills, motivation, education and societal norms of the HN individuals recruited or accepted into the programs. By drawing from a successful village security force program we can better judge the motivation and entry level skills of the individuals. We can also see how they respond to community trust and what they do with the power and responsibility that comes with using arms to secure their village. In addition, we can see how the village responds to them and measure their individual effectiveness before entrusting them with more responsibilities. The village security force members are not policemen, but through a good training program they have the potential to be both capable and trusted.<sup>40</sup>

There are risks and challenges to this policy, and it is worth reviewing the most critical by outlining the risk, its relevance, and the mitigation steps to overcome it.

#### The Government is Corrupt and Will Not Start This Program

In Afghanistan the local people have been drawn into conflicts including: the anti-Soviet insurgency, the warlord's power struggle, the first Taliban-dominated civil war,

our post-9/11 offensive against the Taliban government and, finally, various programs during our current counterinsurgencies. Southern Afghanistani Pashtuns have a tradition of using Arbakai or village security protection forces, and this tradition continues under tribal and governmental controls. Because the government is largely seen as corrupt, its groups are generally not respected. When the local jirga or shura control the village security forces they are respected.<sup>41</sup>

The people and the government do not trust each other, but if there is a guarantor such as NATO they may accept the program. This is an area in which the international or NATO security forces can serve as a successful buffer between the mistrustful sides of the society. We should bring the local jirgas or other respected community groups into the program to help oversee them. We want the people secured and engaged into the public debate and then monitoring of their own government. We also do not have to link these security programs to individual pay, but in areas of severe economic hardship we may. Alternatively, the villages can be rewarded with larger developmental projects alone or with small payments to the village security force members.

### Aren't We Just Creating New Warlords?

Warlords differ from village or tribal leaders because their power and authority is based on their personal power, their charisma, their leadership skills, and their own financial backing. Even when they come from a tribe we can still identify and classify them as warlords based on how they generate their authority. Tribal and other community systems of power and authority are developed forms of social interaction that includes a larger family linkage, long-established responsibilities up and down the power structure, and methods to discuss and implement decisions of the whole tribe.<sup>42</sup>



Tribes and established communities have long traditions for resolving disputes within and against their social structures. These procedures may not be understood by us, but they are understood and accepted by their members who tend to be loyal to the larger group and not to any particular individual. Locally raised forces that are under the control of individuals without community or societal controls are likely to become next year's warlords. The security that they provide now may seem just as valid as a small community or tribally based force, but will cause many more problems in the future and be extremely difficult to reintegrate back into the society. For example, after the Soviets departed Afghanistan and the Afghani warlords defeated the communist puppet regime of Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai, the warlords' quest for power continued through corruption, ministerial infighting, and graft. The charismatic and battle-proven leaders with various ethnic and tribal backgrounds viewed themselves above the tribes and beyond societal accountability. The resulting, ultra-conservative, Taliban backlash was a product of the warlords' excesses.

Any plan that we develop can and should be designed to reinforce communities or societal groupings and not replace them with strong individuals. The near-term gains of supporting an individual-led group are not worth the risks of its future uncontrollable behavior. In addition, the trade off is not necessary because the near-term capabilities of tribally-based or village security forces is at least as strong as any individual-led group.<sup>43</sup>

#### What about HN Governmental Legitimacy?

The programs that I recommend will initially challenge the legitimacy of the HN government. If the security situation can be brought under control by simply supporting the HN government, their military, and police forces we should put all of our efforts

behind the legitimate government. However, in those difficult situations during post-conflict or an active insurgency, when the security situation is desperate and the HN government's power is insufficient we will likely have to begin one of these village security forces programs and later transfer it to the HN government. In these cases their corruption, lack of trust, or even active participation at the political level in the insurgency is inherently part of the problem; the government is illegitimate and no amount of pretending will change it. Part of our overall COIN strategy must modify the HN government's behavior while simultaneously improving the internal security situation.

We have to include good governance development in our overall program.<sup>44</sup> Until we have a HN government that is trusted to oversee the security sector then other international governments security forces, media, and local communities must combine to perform this necessary social function. In parallel, we should take action to improve the HN government and provide opportunities for them to prove trustworthy to their own citizens. Our COIN success will come when we can transition responsibility for security sector supervision back to a trusted HN government.

If we find ourselves in a post-conflict or failed state situation where there is no HN government, then we must provide security and good governance with the international community until one can be developed. We should not rush to install a government and attempt to build its administrative systems solely from the top down. Instead, we should help the people develop their government from both the local and national levels. We should synchronize the combined program from the top to ensure

that both approaches can be melded in the end. If done correctly, HN governmental legitimacy will be earned and recognized by its citizens.

### Recommendations

The practice of forming tribal or community based local defense forces should be integrated into our policy and doctrine for countering wide scale insecurity during post-conflict operations or counterinsurgencies. The programs should be resourced, guided and coordinated as part of our overarching COIN operational plans, and executed from the bottom-up through empowered and culturally-savvy leaders.

Army and joint doctrine should integrate these procedures into their next publications. FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, and JP 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations* should unequivocally include considerations for the creation of local defense forces.

### Conclusion

A successful counterinsurgency campaign must be based on a full understanding of the political and security situation. Within that understanding, the basic nature of the social contract describes the consent of people to be governed and the responsibilities of that government. The very nature of the social contract between the HN government and their citizens is at risk and must be repaired. During a counterinsurgency campaign we can and should begin with a tribal or village-based security force, then build on the improved social contract to reintegrate insurgents, promote economic security, and improve the health, and education conditions.<sup>45</sup>

A properly planned, formed, integrated, and supported community-based security force is an essential component to repairing the social contract and ensuring that the people take up their responsibilities. A correctly formed indigenous security force can be

a visible sign of trust and confidence in the people to rebuild the social contract of personal security, good governance, and the rule-of-law and has proven time and again to be part of a successful COIN operation. The next step is to further build on that trust in the people by drawing from those home guards to develop a trusted and capable police force.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, 1-1.

<sup>2</sup> David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 155.

<sup>3</sup> Derrick Brinkerhoff, Ronald Johnson and Richard Hill, Susan Merrill, *Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?* (Carlisle, PA: RTI International, U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), June 2009), 7.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 12, 2001 & Amended September 30, 2010), 229.

<sup>5</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 74-81.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>7</sup> Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion Insurgency & Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), 49.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>10</sup> Frank D. Pelli, *Insurgency*, "Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam," *Global Security.org*, 1990, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/PFD.htm> (accessed December 13, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 169.

<sup>14</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 155.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 15, 2006).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 5-13, 5-18 thru 5-20.

<sup>18</sup> United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 2-8.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 3-16.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 4-26.

<sup>21</sup> Walter C. Ladwig III, "Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of U.S. Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency," *Comparative Strategy*, no. 26 (2007), 286.

<sup>22</sup> David M. Krall, *Providing Security: The Strategic Importance of Policing*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 19, 2010), 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 7-64.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 4-26.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, D-1.

<sup>26</sup> Ladwig, "Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of U.S. Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency," 289.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>28</sup> Personal conversations from my own Iraqi tour in 2007 identified two Sunni and Shia tribal leaders whose fathers once operated adjacent market stalls in the Khadimiya district of Baghdad, were actively plotting and fighting against each other, as a result of the general lack of security and escalated sectarian violence.

<sup>29</sup> Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 51.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>31</sup> Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, 5-9.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 14-19.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 20-21.

<sup>34</sup> Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi, "Anatomy of a Surrogate: Historical Precedents and Implications for Contemporary Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2009).

<sup>35</sup> Dale C. Kuehl, *Unfinished Business: The Sons of Iraq and Political Reconciliation*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 25, 2010), 15-17.

<sup>36</sup> Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*, 73.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 75,78.

<sup>39</sup> Seth G. Jones, "It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages?page=show> (accessed January 25, 2011).

<sup>40</sup> Raymond A. Millen, "Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause in Afghanistan," *Parameters* 40, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 39.

<sup>41</sup> Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*, 32.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>44</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 6-51.

<sup>45</sup> Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*, 75-76.